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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is a long arm service of process case which requires 
us, for the first time, to apply the Supreme Court's decision 
in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), to a business tort. 
It comes before us on the appeal of the plaintiff, Imo 
Industries Inc. ("Imo"), a multinational corporation with its 
principal place of business in New Jersey, from an order of 
the district court dismissing its action pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction over 
defendant Kiekert AG ("Kiekert"), a German corporation. 
The complaint alleges that Kiekert tortiously interfered with 
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Imo's attempt to sell its wholly-owned Italian subsidiary to 
a French corporation that was one of Kiekert's competitors. 
The asserted mechanism by which the tort was 
accomplished was a series of letters sent by Kiekert to the 
Italian subsidiary and to the New York investmentfirm of 
C.S. First Boston, Imo's representative in the sale, 
threatening that Kiekert would revoke the licensing 
agreement it had with the subsidiary if the deal went 
through. According to Imo, the sale was never 
consummated because of these threats, causing it 
considerable loss. 
 
Imo contends that personal jurisdiction over Kiekert was 
proper based upon its contacts with Imo in New Jersey and 
upon Kiekert's claimed commission of an intentional tort, 
the effects of which were allegedly felt by Imo in New 
Jersey. Because we conclude that Kiekert's contacts with 
the forum would not otherwise satisfy the requirements of 
due process, the question whether personal jurisdiction can 
be exercised here depends upon the applicability to the 
facts of Calder, in which the Supreme Court found personal 
jurisdiction to be proper over nonresident defendants that 
committed an intentional tort outside the forum, the unique 
effects of which caused damage to the plaintiff within the 
forum. We believe that for Calder to apply, the plaintiff 
must allege facts sufficient to meet a three-prong test. First, 
the defendant must have committed an intentional tort. 
Second, the plaintiff must have felt the brunt of the harm 
caused by that tort in the forum, such that the forum can 
be said to be the focal point of the harm suffered by the 
plaintiff as a result of the tort. Third, the defendant must 
have expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum, 
such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the 
tortious activity. 
 
Applying this test to the present facts, we conclude that 
personal jurisdiction does not exist here since Imo has not 
pointed to sufficient facts demonstrating that Kiekert 
"expressly aimed" its tortious conduct at New Jersey. To the 
contrary, the focus of the dispute -- i.e. the proposed sale 
of an Italian company to a French company and a claim of 
rights by a German company pursuant to a license 
agreement apparently governed by German law -- and the 
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alleged contacts by Kiekert (i.e., its correspondence) all 
appear to be focused outside the forum. The order of the 
district court will therefore be affirmed. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
For purposes of this appeal, we accept the plaintiff 's 
allegations as true. See Carteret Savings Bank, FA v. 
Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that an 
appellate court reviewing an order of the district court 
dismissing a case for lack of personal jurisdiction"must 
accept all of the plaintiff 's allegations as true and construe 
disputed facts in favor of plaintiff.") (citing In re Arthur 
Treacher's Franchisee Litigation, 92 F.R.D. 398, 409-10 
(E.D. Pa. 1981)). However, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving that personal jurisdiction is proper. Carteret 
Savings Bank, 954 F.2d at 146 (Once a defendant raises 
the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, "the plaintiff 
bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, 
facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.") (citing 
Time Share Vacation v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 
65 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 
Defendant Kiekert, a manufacturer of automobile door 
latch systems, is a corporation organized, existing under 
the laws of, and having its principal place of business in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Kiekert sells its products 
world-wide, though only 2% of its sales derive from the 
United States market.1 According to Kiekert, it does not 
now engage, nor has it ever engaged in any of the following 
activities in New Jersey: "the manufacture of any products; 
any direct sales; solicitation or advertisement to sell its 
products; any shipment of merchandise directly into or 
through the state, or the supply of services there; the 
maintenance of an office, a mailing address, a telephone 
number, or a bank account; the ownership of any real or 
personal property; the employment of any employees or 
agents; or the requirement of or payment of taxes." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Kiekert's promotional literature projects that the United States market 
will comprise thirty percent of its sales by the year 2000. Since this is 
but a projection, it does not affect the outcome here. 
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Appellee's Br. at 4. Imo does not appear to dispute these 
claims. 
 
Plaintiff Imo, a multinational corporation, is incorporated 
in Delaware with its principal place of business in 
Lawrenceville, New Jersey. Imo has 22 manufacturing 
facilities around the world, including plants in Germany, 
the United Kingdom, France and Australia. Approximately 
90% of Imo's products are marketed outside of the United 
States, and approximately 34% of Imo's total net sales for 
1995 were in these foreign markets. Most relevant to the 
present case is the fact that Imo owns all of the shares of 
an Italian company, Roltra Morse, S.p.A. ("Roltra"), which 
manufactures automobile door latches using technology 
licensed from Kiekert. The licensing agreement was 
negotiated in Germany and Italy in 1993 and it provides 
that the agreement shall be governed by German law. Imo 
was not a party to this licensing agreement and did not 
participate in the negotiation or execution thereof. 
 
In December 1995, Imo decided to sell its shares in 
Roltra and retained the New York investment firm of C.S. 
First Boston Corporation ("First Boston") to act as its 
representative. On Imo's behalf, First Boston solicited bids 
from corporations interested in acquiring Imo's shares of 
Roltra. Valeo, S.A. ("Valeo"), a French corporation and one 
of Kiekert's competitors, submitted a bid of $72 million for 
the shares. Kiekert also submitted a bid, though for only 
$30 million. Imo and Valeo thereafter proceeded to prepare 
final agreements to close the sale of Roltra's stock for $69 
million, and Kiekert was notified on or about June 12, 
1996, that its bid was insufficient. 
 
Shortly thereafter, and prior to closing, Kiekert sent a 
letter to First Boston in New York stating that, under its 
agreement with Roltra, Kiekert had the right to revoke its 
license for the door latch technology if Roltra's shares were 
sold to one of its competitors. More specifically, the letter to 
First Boston, dated June 17, 1996, stated in pertinent part 
that "Kiekert's license and patents . . . cannot be 
transferred if [Roltra] is taken over by one of our 
competitors" and if this occurs, Kiekert "would have to 
retire [its] acceptance of production for these products 
immediately which are manufactured under our license." 
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The import of such an action was clear -- if the license was 
revoked, Roltra's value as a going concern would be 
severely impacted. In addition, Kiekert wrote to Roltra in 
Italy on July 8, 1996, similarly stating Kiekert's intent to 
terminate the licensing agreement if Roltra's shares were 
sold to a competitor. 
 
First Boston forwarded the June 17 letter to Imo in New 
Jersey. Imo responded directly to Kiekert by letter dated 
July 9, 1996, stating its position that Kiekert was"not 
entitled by contract or law to rescind or otherwise terminate 
the License Agreement in the event of sale of the shares to 
any third party." Imo demanded "that [Kiekert] cease and 
desist from making such statements to any third party," 
and advised that if it "continue[s] to make such statements 
[it] . . . will be held responsible for all damages that [Roltra] 
and/or its shareholders suffer from such representations." 
Roltra also forwarded the July 8 letter to Imo in New 
Jersey. Imo again responded directly to Kiekert by letter 
dated August 12, stating that its "tortious and illegal 
conduct is seriously jeopardizing [our] ability to close this 
transaction," and that "unless you immediately withdraw 
your threats of termination, we are prepared tofile lawsuits 
in all appropriate jurisdictions, including the United States 
. . ." 
 
In addition to the mail contacts, Kiekert officials in 
Germany and Imo officials in New Jersey spoke twice by 
telephone during this time concerning the license 
agreement. The record reveals that representatives of Imo 
initiated these calls. See Appellant's Br. at 21. Finally, Imo 
requested meetings with Kiekert in an attempt to resolve 
the matter. One such meeting was held in Toronto on 
August 27, 1996, and two more were held on September 10 
of that year in Germany. These discussions apparently 
failed to persuade Kiekert to change its position. 
 
On October 28, 1996, Valeo advised Imo of its withdrawal 
from negotiations concerning the sale of Roltra's shares. By 
letter, it informed Imo that "[w]e have concluded that, 
irrespective of the likelihood that Kiekert's position would 
prevail, Kiekert's position regarding its license can be 
expected to have a disruptive impact on the business of 
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Roltra . . . and in particular create disturbances with 
customers during the period of any litigation." 
 
Imo thereafter sued in the District Court for the District 
of New Jersey, alleging that Kiekert's actions constituted 
tortious activity and caused significant damage to it in New 
Jersey. Subject matter jurisdiction was premised on 
diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C.S 1332. According to 
Imo, Valeo's decision to break off the contract negotiations 
was directly caused by Kiekert's steadfast assertion of its 
intent to revoke its license if the proposed sale was 
consummated. As a result, Imo alleges that it has suffered 
injuries in numerous forms due to its inability to 
consummate the deal. First, Imo alleges that the sale to 
Valeo would have resulted in a profit of more than $20 
million. Second, Imo submits that, because of its inability 
to sell the Roltra shares, it has been forced to reclassify 
Roltra as a continuing operation, with a concomitant 
restatement of its third quarter earnings. This has allegedly 
resulted in the reversal of a favorable $10 million tax 
benefit based on the anticipated sale, the recognition of 
$4.8 million in previously deferred 1996 losses relating to 
Roltra, liabilities for banking and legal fees, as well as the 
diminution of Roltra's stock value. See Appellant's Br. at 9. 
 
Kiekert moved to dismiss Imo's action for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, contending that it did not have the requisite 
minimum contacts with New Jersey to sustain jurisdiction 
in that forum. The district court granted the motion. We 
review de novo the district court's dismissal for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. 
Consolidated Fiber Glass Products Co., 75 F.3d 147, 150 
(3d Cir. 1996) ("Whether personal jurisdiction may be 
exercised over an out-of-state defendant is a question of 
law, and this court's review is therefore plenary."); Madara 
v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 
II. Due Process Limits on the Exercise of Personal 
Jurisdiction 
 
The fundamental principles of long arm jurisdiction are 
extremely familiar and, since they have been repeated 
countless times in the jurisprudence, little will be served by 
 
                                7 
  
rescribing them at any length here. In brief, to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, a federal court 
sitting in diversity must undertake a two-step inquiry. 
First, the court must apply the relevant state long-arm 
statute to see if it permits the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction; then, the court must apply the precepts of the 
Due Process Clause of the Constitution. In New Jersey, this 
inquiry is collapsed into a single step because the New 
Jersey long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction to the fullest limits of due process. See 
DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 
(3d Cir. 1981). This being the case, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has made it clear that New Jersey courts 
look to federal law for the interpretation of the limits on in 
personam jurisdiction. Mesalic v. Fiberfloat Corp., 897 F.2d 
696, 698 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
Personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause 
depends upon "the relationship among the defendant, the 
forum, and the litigation." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 
204 (1977). Physical presence within the forum is not 
required to establish personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). Instead, the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant has purposefully directed its activities 
toward the residents of the forum state, see id.  at 472, or 
otherwise "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking 
the benefits and protections of its laws." See Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 
Where, as here, the plaintiff 's cause of action is related 
to or arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum, 
the court is said to exercise "specific jurisdiction." See 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 
408, 414 n.8 (1984).2 In order for specific jurisdiction to be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. If the plaintiff 's claim does not arise out of the defendant's 
contacts 
with the forum, the court is said to exercise "general jurisdiction." See 
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 & n.9. To establish general jurisdiction 
over a defendant, the contacts must be shown to be"continuous and 
systematic". See id. at 416. Imo does not contend that the New Jersey 
courts could exercise general jurisdiction over Kiekert. 
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properly exercised under the Due Process Clause, the 
plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test. First, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant has constitutionally 
sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum. See Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). Second, 
for jurisdiction to be exercised the court must determine, in 
its discretion, "that to do so would comport with`traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " See Vetrotex, 
75 F.3d at 150-51 (citing International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). Although this case 
raises some interesting issues regarding the application of 
the "fair play and substantial justice" standard, we need 
not reach them since, as we discuss below, Imo has not 
met its burden of demonstrating Kiekert's minimum 
contacts with the forum. 
 
We note initially that specific jurisdiction will not lie here 
on the basis of Kiekert's alleged contacts with the forum 
alone, for (as we detail in the margin) they are far too small 
to comport with the requirements of due process. 3 Since 
 
(Text continued on page 11) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In brief, Imo argues that specific jurisdiction can be premised on the 
following contacts: (1) the June 17 letter from Kiekert to First Boston; 
(2) 
the July 8 letter from Kiekert to Roltra; (3) the two phone calls from 
Imo's general counsel in New Jersey to Kiekert; and (4) the August and 
September face-to-face meetings in Toronto and Germany. Although 
neither of Kiekert's letters were sent to New Jersey, Imo asserts that 
Kiekert "certainly knew" that its correspondence would both be 
transmitted to Imo in New Jersey and cause injury to Imo there. 
Appellant's Br. at 19. Similarly, Imo contends that Kiekert knew that the 
face-to-face meetings, though occurring outside the United States, would 
result in injury to Imo in New Jersey. 
 
We believe that these contacts, considered as a whole, are insufficient 
to demonstrate, even at a minimal level, that Kiekert has purposefully 
directed its activities toward the forum or has purposefully availed 
itself 
of the privilege of conducting its activities within the forum. The weight 
of authority among the courts of appeal is that minimal communication 
between the defendant and the plaintiff in the forum state, without more, 
will not subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of that state's court 
system. For instance, this court in Carteret Savings Bank, 954 F.2d at 
149, noted that "some minimal correspondence alone will not satisfy 
minimum contacts." This conclusion has been reached by a number of 
the other circuits, and we respect the weight of this authority. See, 
e.g., 
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Stover v. O'Connell Associates, Inc., 84 F.3d 132, 137 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 437 (1996) ("Ordering a product or 
service by telephone from a company in a different state does not subject 
the customer to that state's jurisdiction."); Far West Capital, Inc. v. 
Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1077 (10th Cir. 1995) ("It is well-established that 
phone calls and letters are not necessarily sufficient in themselves to 
establish minimum contacts."); Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed., 
23 F.3d 1110, 1119 (6th Cir. 1994) ("The use of interstate facilities such 
as the telephone and mail is a secondary or ancillary factor and cannot 
alone provide the minimum contacts required by due process.") (quoting 
Scullin Steel Co. v. National Railway Utilization Corp., 676 F.2d 309, 314 
(8th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cote v. Wadel, 796 
F.2d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding insufficient a "handful" of letters 
and phone calls exchanged between plaintiff and defendant). 
 
In the present case, not only are the communications limited in 
quantity, but there is not even one direct act of"entry" into New Jersey 
by Kiekert -- the letters were sent to Italy and New York, the phone calls 
were placed by Imo itself, and the meetings were held in Canada and 
Germany. While in some cases there might be merit to the argument 
that correspondence sent to a third-party outside the forum which 
foreseeably would wind up within the forum could weigh in favor of a 
finding of specific jurisdiction being properly exercised, in the present 
case we are not persuaded that the Kiekert letters provide such weight. 
The same must be said for the two phone calls, which strike us as 
purely unilateral conduct by Imo. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 ("[T]he 
unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a 
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the 
forum State."). 
 
There is also an aspect of foreseeability that we believe is missing in 
this case. The Supreme Court has concluded that"foreseeability alone 
has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under 
the Due Process Clause . . . . [T]he foreseeability that is critical to 
due 
process analysis is . . . . that the defendant's conduct and connection 
with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). We do 
not believe that it was reasonably foreseeable to Kiekert that its 
connection with New Jersey was such that that it should reasonably 
have anticipated being haled into court there. From Kiekert's perspective, 
it entered into a License Agreement with an Italian company in 
Germany, which was to be governed by German law. Imo took no part 
at all in these contract negotiations. It was perfectly reasonable, 
 
                                10 
  
this is an intentional tort case, we must consider whether 
the application of Calder v. Jones, supra, can change the 
outcome. Generally speaking, under Calder an intentional 
tort directed at the plaintiff and having sufficient impact 
upon it in the forum may suffice to enhance otherwise 
insufficient contacts with the forum such that the 
"minimum contacts" prong of the Due Process test is 
satisfied. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 
770, 780 (1984). We therefore concentrate our minimum 
contacts discussion below on the Calder test. 
 
III. The Import of Calder v. Jones 
 
A. The Calder Holding 
 
In Calder, entertainer Shirley Jones brought an action in 
California against the author and editor of an article which 
had appeared in the National Enquirer, and which she 
claimed was defamatory. The article alleged that Jones had 
a problem with alcohol which prevented her from fulfilling 
her professional obligations. Although the Enquirer was 
distributed nationally, it had its largest circulation in 
California. Defendant South, the reporter, did most of his 
research in Florida, relying on phone calls to California for 
information. Defendant Calder had no such contacts with 
California. He reviewed and approved the initial evaluation 
of the topic of the article and edited drafts to itsfinal form. 
See id. at 785-86. Both defendants, residents of Florida, 
moved to dismiss Jones' suit for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. 
 
The Court found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over the defendants was proper. The Court concluded: 
 
       The allegedly libelous story concerned the California 
       activities of a California resident. It impugned the 
       professionalism of an entertainer whose television 
       career was centered in California. The article was 
       drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
therefore, for Kiekert to believe when it entered into the agreement, that 
it would be able to enforce its rights under the contract without being 
subject to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts. 
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       harm, in terms of both respondent's emotional distress 
       and the injury to her professional reputation, was 
       suffered in California. In sum, California is the focal 
       point both of the story and of the harm suffered. 
       Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in 
       California based on the "effects" of their Florida 
       conduct in California. . . . [T]heir intentional, and 
       allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at 
       California. Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder 
       edited an article that they knew would have a 
       potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And 
       they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by 
       respondent in the State in which she lives and works 
       and in which the National Enquirer has its largest 
       circulation. 
 
Id. at 788-90 (footnote omitted). It is from this passage that 
courts have drawn what has come to be known as the 
Calder "effects test." We have observed that under this test 
a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant who commits an intentional tort by 
certain acts outside the forum which have a particular type 
of effect upon the plaintiff within the forum. See Carteret 
Savings Bank, 954 F.2d at 148.4 Imo argues that the 
present case falls within Calder's purview because Kiekert 
"set upon a deliberate and intentional course designed to 
prevent Imo from selling Roltra to one of Kiekert's 
competitors," and because "Kiekert's tortious conduct was 
specifically aimed at and caused injury to Imo (a New 
Jersey resident) within the State of New Jersey." Appellant's 
Br. at 15. We disagree. 
 
B. Calder and Business Torts 
 
Calder's holding cannot be severed from its facts. In order 
to reach the conclusion that jurisdiction was properly 
exercised by the California court in that case, the Supreme 
Court relied on three principal findings. First, the 
defendant committed an intentional tort. Second, the forum 
was the focal point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as 
a result of that tort. Third, the forum was the focal point of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note that the interpretation of Calder  in Carteret Savings Bank was 
not necessary to our holding, and was therefore dicta. 
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the tortious activity in the sense that the tort was 
"expressly aimed" at the forum. Essential was a corollary 
finding that the defendants knew that the "brunt" of the 
injury caused by their tortious acts would be felt by the 
plaintiff in the forum. In applying Calder outside the 
defamation context, courts have adopted varying versions of 
these factors as the "effects test," yielding a mixture of 
broad and narrow interpretations. Since we have not 
applied Calder to a case involving business torts, we turn 
to a subset of these cases for guidance. 
 
The majority of our sister circuits that have considered 
the application of Calder to business torts have adopted a 
narrow construction. One such case is Far West Capital, 
Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1995), which 
assessed the following facts to determine the existence vel 
non of personal jurisdiction in Utah. Towne, a Nevada 
resident who owned real property in Nevada, negotiated 
with plaintiff Far West Capital ("FWC"), a Utah corporation, 
which was interested in developing Towne's land. Although 
the negotiations occurred in Nevada, Towne sent a number 
of letters and faxes to the plaintiff in Utah, and there was 
an escrow account set up in Utah. Furthermore, during the 
negotiations Towne hired a consultant, a Utah resident, 
who occasionally picked up materials from FWC in Utah. 
The parties ultimately entered into a lease, which included 
a provision that the agreement would be governed by 
Nevada law. FWC subsequently negotiated with a third 
party in California regarding financing for the construction 
of a power plant on the property. Towne interfered, and 
FWC brought suit in Utah for, inter alia, intentional 
interference with contractual relations. See id.  at 1073-74. 
 
Towne claimed that she was not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in Utah for lack of minimum contacts. FWC 
rejoined that personal jurisdiction was proper under Calder 
because Towne had intentionally committed torts against it 
in Utah. The Tenth Circuit held that jurisdiction would not 
lie under Calder. See id. at 1080. The court noted initially 
that Calder did not set forth a per se rule that the 
allegation of an intentional business tort alone is sufficient 
to confer personal jurisdiction in the forum where the 
plaintiff resides. See id. at 1078. Instead, the court held 
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that it must still examine the "prior negotiations and 
contemplated future consequences along with the terms of 
the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing" and 
"the contacts created by the out-of-state defendant in 
committing the alleged tort." Id. at 1079-80. The court 
concluded that, on the facts of this case: 
 
       [T]here is no indication that Utah had anything but a 
       fortuitous role in the parties past dealing or would 
       have any role in their continuing relationship. . . . 
       There is thus no evidence that defendants' alleged torts 
       had any connection to Utah beyond plaintiff 's 
       corporate domicile. Although FWC argues that it 
       suffered the financial effects of these alleged torts in 
       Utah where it is incorporated, we hold that under 
       Calder and its progeny, the defendants' contacts with 
       Utah are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction 
       in this case. 
 
Id. at 1080. 
 
On facts strikingly similar to our own, the Fifth Circuit 
reached a similar conclusion in Southmark Corp. v. Life 
Investors Inc., 851 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1988). There, the 
question was whether personal jurisdiction would lie 
properly in Texas. Defendant Life Investors Inc. ("Life") 
owned 22% of the outstanding shares of International Bank 
("IB") stock. Southmark, a Georgia corporation with its 
principal place of business in Texas, began negotiating with 
Life to purchase its shares of IB, with Southmark 
contending that the parties had ultimately formed a 
contract. Life, however, sold its shares to USLICO. 
Southmark brought suit in Texas against Life and joined 
USLICO as a defendant, claiming tortious interference with 
the alleged contract and business relations. USLICO, a 
Virginia corporation, moved to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. Relying principally on Calder, Southmark 
contended that the exercise of specific jurisdiction was 
proper because USLICO had committed an intentional tort 
against it in Texas with knowledge that it was a Texas 
resident. See id. at 772. 
 
The court rejected this argument, holding that "there is 
no evidence that USLICO expressly aimed its allegedly 
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tortious activities at Texas, nor is there evidence that 
USLICO knew the brunt of Southmark's injury would be felt 
there." Id. Moreover, the court found that "nothing in the 
record indicates that USLICO expressly aimed its allegedly 
tortious activities at Texas, or that Texas is even the focal 
point of USLICO's tortious conduct." Id. at 773. The court 
also underscored the fact that the oral agreement with 
which USLICO allegedly interfered was negotiated outside of 
the forum state, and there was no evidence that the 
agreement was made or to be performed in the forum or 
governed by its laws. See id. at 772-73. 
 
The court concluded that the fact that the plaintiff had 
its principal place of business in the forum was a"mere 
fortuity," and declined to exercise jurisdiction. See id. at 
773. Importantly, the court reasoned: 
 
       While it may be true that USLICO agreed to buy the 
       stock knowing that Southmark has its principal place 
       of business in Texas, and that Southmark is therefore 
       a Texas resident for jurisdictional purposes, we do not 
       think this fact standing alone would cause USLICO to 
       anticipate being haled into a Texas court to answer for 
       its conduct. 
 
Id. In other words, the Fifth Circuit was unconvinced of two 
critical facts. First, the court was not persuaded that 
Southmark would feel the brunt of the injury caused by 
USLICO in Texas simply because its principal place of 
business was located there. See id. Second, the court was 
not persuaded that USLICO's intent to interfere with the 
contractual relations of a company residing in Texas 
necessarily meant that USLICO had "expressly aimed" its 
tortious conduct at Texas. Id. at 772. 
 
This concern over whether a court can automatically 
infer that a defendant expressly aimed its tortious conduct 
at the forum from the fact that that defendant knew that 
the plaintiff resided in the forum was also addressed in 
Esab Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied ___U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 1364 (1998). 
Plaintiff, a Delaware corporation residing in South Carolina, 
brought suit in South Carolina alleging that the defendant, 
a New Hampshire company, participated in a conspiracy to 
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appropriate plaintiff 's trade secrets and customer lists. All 
the alleged co-conspirators were either Florida or New 
Hampshire residents. The only South Carolina "contact" in 
the case was the defendant's knowledge that his acquisition 
of the trade secrets could result in lowered sales for the 
plaintiff. Id. at 625. The Fourth Circuit concluded that this 
knowledge alone did not "manifest behavior intentionally 
targeted at and focused on South Carolina" under Calder. 
Id. The court further reasoned that while it is true that a 
corporation "feels" lost sales at its headquarters, permitting 
Calder to be satisfied on this basis would mean that 
jurisdiction in intentional tort cases would always be 
appropriate in the plaintiff 's home state, since the plaintiff 
always "feels" the impact of the tort there. Id. at 625-26. 
 
In sum, Far West, Southmark and Esab Group all stand 
for the proposition that the mere allegation that the plaintiff 
feels the effect of the defendant's tortious conduct in the 
forum because the plaintiff is located there is insufficient to 
satisfy Calder. In all of those cases, the plaintiffs failed to 
point to other actions that adequately demonstrated that 
the defendants targeted (or "expressly aimed" their conduct 
at) the forum, and thereby showed that the forum was the 
focal point of the tortious activity. See also General Electric 
Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1387-88 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (concluding that Calder is of little help to a 
plaintiff where the "focal point of the alleged wrongdoing" 
occurred outside of the forum even where the "effects of the 
harm" occurred in that state); Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 
F.3d 85, 90-91 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that Calder test was 
not satisfied because defendants did not target forum even 
though plaintiffs felt tortious effect there). Moreover, Calder 
requires that the "brunt" of the harm be felt in the forum. 
See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. These cases cast doubt on the 
assertion that a company will feel the "brunt" of a tort 
injury at its principal place of business when that injury is 
based on damage to contracts or property not centered in 
the forum. 
 
There is one counterpoint, however, for the Seventh 
Circuit recently endorsed a broader reading of Calder. In 
Janmark, Inc. v. Ready, 132 F.3d 1200 (7th Cir. 1997), 
both plaintiff and defendant sold mini shopping carts 
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nationwide; Janmark did so from its base in Illinois, and 
Ready (through his company Dreamkeeper) from California. 
Ready believed that he had a copyright in the Dreamkeeper 
cart design, and tried to use his copyright claim to 
"orchestrate an agreement" among all mini shopping-cart 
sellers. See 132 F.3d at 1202. Janmark resisted Ready's 
overtures, and Ready allegedly responded by threatening 
Janmark's customers with suits for contributory copyright 
infringement. According to Janmark, one such threat 
induced a customer in New Jersey to cease buying from 
Janmark, which Janmark contended was an intentional 
tort in Illinois sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction 
there under Calder. 
 
The Seventh Circuit found that the Illinois court could 
properly exercise jurisdiction over Ready. The court stated 
that, after Calder "there can be no serious doubt . . . that 
the state in which the victim of a tort suffers the injury may 
entertain a suit against the accused tortfeasor." Janmark, 
132 F.3d at 1202. The court further opined that since "a 
wrong does not become a `tort' until an injury has 
occurred," the complained-of tort of interference with 
prospective economic advantage was not completed until 
Janmark's customer in New Jersey canceled his order. Id. 
Accordingly, the court concluded, the injury (and hence the 
tort) occurred in Illinois, and thus jurisdiction was properly 
laid there. Id. 
 
Finding the cases previously cited to be better reasoned, 
we decline to follow Janmark. We believe that the Seventh 
Circuit interpreted Calder too broadly when it read that 
case to hold that "the state in which the victim of a tort 
suffers the injury may entertain a suit against the accused 
tortfeasor." Janmark, 132 F.2d at 1202. Even assuming 
that the Seventh Circuit was only referring to intentional 
torts (since Calder clearly was clearly not concerned with 
negligence), such a broad sweep fails to accommodate 
Calder's emphasis on the fact that the forum must be the 
focal point of the harm and that the defendant must 
expressly aim the tortious activity at the forum. Janmark 
relies solely on the geographical locus of the harm caused; 
in doing so, it fails to pay necessary attention to the 
 
                                17 
  
defendant's knowledge and intent in committing the 
tortious activity.5 
 
A hypothetical, posed to counsel at oral argument, may 
clarify this point. Suppose X, a closely-held corporation 
incorporated and located in New Jersey, purchases W, a 
French widget manufacturing company. Further suppose 
that Y, another French corporation that also manufactures 
and distributes widgets, interferes with W's prospective 
business advantage by tortiously acquiring W's largest 
customer, causing the value of W's stock to plummet. 
Finally, assume that Y was unaware that X had become the 
owner of W at the time the tortious acts were committed. 
We believe that, under Calder, X would not be able to sue 
Y for its intentional torts in the New Jersey district court. 
Even if we assume that the Calder test is otherwise 
satisfied, it would be impossible to conclude that Y 
expressly aimed its tortious activity at New Jersey since Y 
simply did not know that a New Jersey corporation could 
be the victim of its conduct. Under a literal reading of 
Janmark, however, personal jurisdiction would appear to be 
appropriate in New Jersey if we concluded (as the Janmark 
court presumably would) that the injury occurred there.6 
 
An analogous situation to our hypothetical was presented 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As we explain infra in footnote 9, we need not (and do not) deal with 
the "focal point of the harm" issue here. 
 
6. To be fair, this hypothetical is different from Janmark in at least one 
important respect. The hypothetical sets up a three-party scenario 
wherein Y knows that it is tortiously interfering with W, but is not aware 
of X, the absentee foreign owner. In Janmark, by contrast, there were 
only two players -- Janmark and Dreamkeeper -- and thus it may have 
been obvious to the Seventh Circuit that Janmark knew where its victim 
was located (and presumably where it would feel the brunt of the injury) 
when it committed its tortious acts. To that end, Janmark may not have 
discussed the tortfeasor's knowledge because it simply was not in 
dispute. As we discuss below, however, we believe that the presence of 
such knowledge, without more, is itself insufficient to satisfy Calder's 
"expressly aimed" requirement. Moreover, our speculation about what 
facts may have been obvious to the panel that decided Janmark does not 
change the fact that that case does not apply the"expressly aimed" 
requirement and, to the contrary, contains the overly broad language 
discussed supra. 
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to the Ninth Circuit in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 
F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997). In that case, the plaintiff, an 
Arizona corporation, provided Internet marketing services 
through its web site under the registered service mark 
"Cybersell." The defendant, a Florida corporation, provided 
business consulting services through its web site under the 
same name. At the time the defendant chose the name 
"Cybersell" for its venture, the plaintiff 's web site was not 
operational, and the Patent and Trademark Office had not 
granted plaintiff 's application for the service mark. See 130 
F.3d at 415. Plaintiff instituted suit in the District of 
Arizona, alleging, inter alia, trademark infringement, and 
defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that 
jurisdiction was proper under Calder, reasoning that the 
defendant's web site was "not aimed intentionally at 
Arizona knowing that harm was likely to be caused there." 
Id. at 420. As with our hypothetical, even if we assume that 
the plaintiff suffered its injury in Arizona (which the Ninth 
Circuit did not, see id.), Calder would not support 
jurisdiction here since the defendants could not have 
expressly aimed their conduct at the forum.7 
 
We recognize that a conservative reading of Calder may 
significantly limit the types of business tort cases that will 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In contrast is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Panavision Int'l, L.P. 
v. 
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998), another cyberspace case. There, 
the plaintiff (who manufactured motion picture camera equipment and 
whose principal place of business was in California) brought suit against 
an Illinois defendant in California for dilution of its trademark. The 
defendant allegedly had established a web site using Panavision's 
trademark as its domain name, preventing Panavision from registering 
its own web site on the Internet with the domain name "Panavision.com," 
in order to force Panavision to pay the defendant a fee to use the name 
on the Internet. See id. at 1321. The defendant moved to dismiss on 
personal jurisdiction grounds. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding the 
jurisdiction was proper under Calder since the defendant knew that 
plaintiff would suffer harm in California because, as in Calder, the heart 
of the motion picture industry is located there. See id. at 1321-22. In 
our 
view, the dispositive facts of Panavision closely track those of Calder 
(i.e., 
the unique relationship between the motion picture industry and the 
forum), and therefore this case does not undermine the analysis in 
Cybersell. 
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satisfy the requirements of personal jurisdiction via the 
"effects test." Yet, we believe that such a result is consistent 
with the Supreme Court's intended relationship between 
Calder and the traditional minimum contacts analysis. 
Calder did not change the fact that even in intentional tort 
cases the jurisdictional inquiry "focuses on the relations 
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." See 
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780. Nor did Calder carve out a special 
intentional torts exception to the traditional specific 
jurisdiction analysis, so that a plaintiff could always sue in 
his or her home state. What Calder did was recognize that, 
under certain circumstances, the "plaintiff 's residence in 
the forum may, because of defendant's relationship with 
the plaintiff, enhance defendant's contacts with the forum. 
Plaintiff 's residence may be the focus of the activities of the 
defendant out of which the suit arises." Keeton, 465 U.S. at 
780 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89). That is, the unique 
relations among the defendant, the forum, the intentional 
tort, and the plaintiff may under certain circumstances 
render the defendant's contacts with the forum -- which 
otherwise would not satisfy the requirements of due process 
-- sufficient. 
 
Accordingly, we reject Janmark and agree with the 
conclusion reached by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that jurisdiction under Calder 
requires more than a finding that the harm caused by the 
defendant's intentional tort is primarily felt within the 
forum. Moreover, we agree with the Far West, Southmark, 
and Esab Group decisions that the Calder  "effects test" can 
only be satisfied if the plaintiff can point to contacts which 
demonstrate that the defendant expressly aimed  its tortious 
conduct at the forum, and thereby made the forum the 
focal point of the tortious activity. Simply asserting that the 
defendant knew that the plaintiff 's principal place of 
business was located in the forum would be insufficient in 
itself to meet this requirement.8 The defendant must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Thus, to return to the hypothetical raised above, the fact that Y (our 
tortfeasing widget concern) knew that W (its competitor) was owned by 
X (the New Jersey company) and that X would experience the injury 
caused by the drop in W's value at its headquarters in New Jersey would 
not by itself be enough to meet X's burden to show that Y "expressly 
aimed" its conduct at New Jersey. 
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"manifest behavior intentionally targeted at and focused on" 
the forum for Calder to be satisfied. Esab Group, 126 F.3d 
at 625; see also Southmark, 852 F.2d at 773. In the typical 
case, this will require some type of "entry" into the forum 
state by the defendant. As even the Seventh Circuit has 
noted: 
 
       In Calder as in all the other cases that have come to 
       our attention in which jurisdiction over a suit involving 
       intellectual property (when broadly defined to include 
       reputation, so that it includes Calder itself) was 
       upheld, the defendant had done more than brought 
       about an injury to an interest located in a particular 
       state. The defendant had also "entered" the state in 
       some fashion, as by the sale (in Calder) of the 
       magazine containing the defamatory material. 
 
Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football 
Club, 34 F.3d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 
To summarize, we believe that the Calder"effects test" 
requires the plaintiff to show the following: 
 
       1) The defendant committed an intentional tort; 
 
       2) The plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum 
       such that the forum can be said to be the focal 
       point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a 
       result of that tort;9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We note that, although we need not accept or reject for purposes of 
this appeal the proposition that the effects of Kiekert's conduct were 
"felt" by Imo in New Jersey, the proper resolution of this issue is far 
from 
clear. The alleged harm in this case was felt by a corporation, not an 
individual, and at least one court has concluded that a corporation "does 
not suffer harm in a particular geographic location in the same sense 
that an individual does." Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus., 11 F.3d 1482, 
1486 (9th Cir. 1993). Moreover, a distinction could arguably be made 
between torts against a corporation resulting in specific property damage 
(e.g., if Kiekert had physically destroyed Imo property) and those torts 
resulting in more inchoate injuries (e.g., a decrease in stock value), 
like 
those alleged here. At the same time, this court has previously stated in 
a personal jurisdiction case, albeit in dicta, that"[i]t is questionable 
judicial policy to apply a different jurisdictional rule to individuals 
than 
to corporations, to small enterprises than to large ones. To indulge in 
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       3) The defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct 
       at the forum such that the forum can be said to be 
       the focal point of the tortious activity; 
 
As the above discussion suggests, in order to make out the 
third prong of this test, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant knew that the plaintiff would suffer the brunt of 
the harm caused by the tortious conduct in the forum, and 
point to specific activity indicating that the defendant 
expressly aimed its tortious conduct at the forum. 
 
C. Application 
 
In view of the foregoing analysis, the critical question in 
this case is whether Imo has pointed to acts undertaken by 
Kiekert which demonstrate that it "expressly aimed" its 
tortious conduct at New Jersey, distinguishing it from the 
defendants in Far West, Southmark, and Esab Group. Only 
if this requirement is satisfied need we consider whether 
the brunt of the harm was actually suffered by Imo in the 
forum. At oral argument, counsel for Imo drew our 
attention to the following seven facts: 
 
       1) Kiekert knew that Imo was headquartered in New 
       Jersey; 
 
       2) Kiekert knew that Imo had agreed to sell its stock 
       in Roltra to Valeo; 
 
       3) Kiekert engaged in a series of phone calls, letters 
       and meetings which interfered with the proposed 
       Valeo contract; 
 
       4) Kiekert acted with the intent to scuttle the 
       contract; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
such ad hoc determinations creates confusion where there should be 
certainty. . . ." Dollar Savings Bank v. First Security Bank of Utah, 746 
F.2d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 1984). That case dealt with different factual 
circumstances and was not concerned with whether a plaintiff "felt" the 
effects of a defendant's tortious conduct for Calder analysis purposes. 
However, because our decision is based on other grounds, we need not 
decide how our reasoning in Dollar would apply in the context of a 
Calder analysis. 
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       5) There were two calls from New Jersey to Kiekert in 
       Germany; 
 
       6) Kiekert wrote to First Boston in New York, and it 
       was reasonably foreseeable that such 
       correspondence would be transmitted to Imo in 
       New Jersey, as evidenced by the fact that it was 
       Imo (not First Boston) who actually authored the 
       response; 
 
       7) Imo put Kiekert on notice that its conduct would 
       subject it to litigation in the United States. 
 
According to Imo, these facts indicate that Kiekert acted in 
a manner that specifically involved New Jersey, and 
therefore Calder's targeting requirement is satisfied. 
 
Essentially, this list boils down to two congeries of facts: 
(1) what Kiekert knew or intended when it undertook its 
allegedly tortious conduct; and (2) what steps Kiekert 
actually took during the relevant time period. It appears 
from the facts as alleged by Imo that Kiekert (unlike the 
defendant in our hypothetical or the defendant in Cybersell) 
knew that Imo was the parent company of Roltra, and that 
Imo was located in New Jersey. And for purposes of the 
present appeal, we must assume that Kiekert knew of the 
proposed sale to Valeo and acted with the intent to 
undermine that contract. While knowledge that the plaintiff 
is located in the forum is necessary to the application of 
Calder, as discussed above it alone is insufficient to satisfy 
the targeting prong of the effects test. For the same 
reasons, the fact that Imo advised Kiekert that it would 
pursue litigation in the United States sheds no light on 
whether Kiekert aimed its conduct at New Jersey. 
 
Thus, we are left to determine whether the series of 
letters, phone calls, and meetings between June and 
September 1996 sufficiently demonstrate that Kiekert 
expressly aimed its conduct at New Jersey. As we discussed 
supra, the chronology includes the following events: 
 
       a) The June 17 letter from Kiekert to First Boston 
       stating that the Kiekert licenses could not be 
       transferred if Roltra was sold to one of Kiekert's 
       competitors; 
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       b) The July 8 letter from Kiekert to Roltra stating that 
       Kiekert would terminate the licensing agreement if 
       Roltra's shares were sold to a competitor; 
 
       c) Imo's letter in response to Kiekert's letter to First 
       Boston, dated July 9; 
 
       d) Imo's letter in response to Kiekert's letter to Roltra, 
       dated August 12; 
 
       e) On two occasions during this time, Imo's general 
       counsel telephoned Kiekert from Imo's New Jersey 
       offices. During these conversations, Kiekert 
       confirmed that if Imo sold the Roltra shares to a 
       competitor, the license agreement would be 
       terminated; 
 
       f)  The August 27 meeting in Toronto between 
       representatives of Kiekert and Imo; 
 
       g) The September 10 meetings between Kiekert and 
       Imo in Germany. 
 
We first consider the face-to-face meetings between 
Kiekert and Imo. Since none of these meetings occurred in 
New Jersey (or even in the United States), they provide no 
help to Imo in demonstrating that Kiekert targeted the 
forum. We turn next to the written correspondence. There 
is no dispute that all of Kiekert's letters were sent either to 
First Boston in New York or to Roltra in Italy. Imo submits, 
however, that when Kiekert mailed these letters, it was 
reasonably foreseeable that they would wind up in New 
Jersey, evidenced by the fact that the responses to both 
letters came from Imo's New Jersey offices. Even viewed in 
the light most favorable to Imo, we believe that these facts 
are insufficient to demonstrate that Kiekert expressly aimed 
its conduct at New Jersey. Kiekert's two letters were sent to 
New York and to Italy; even if it reasonably knew that those 
letters would be forwarded to Imo in New Jersey, Kiekert's 
acts were not directed there. To the contrary, an 
examination of these letters reveals that Kiekert was 
focusing its attention on First Boston and on Roltra, not on 
Imo. 
 
This position is supported by Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur 
Athletic Fed., 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff in 
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that case -- Butch Reynolds, a world-class runner-- was 
administered a drug test which yielded a positive result. As 
a consequence, he was banned by the International 
Amateur Athletic Federation ("IAAF") from competing for 
two years. In addition, the IAAF issued a press release 
disclosing the results of the drug test. Reynolds brought 
suit in Ohio, alleging that the drug test was flawed and 
claiming defamation and tortious interference with 
contractual relations. 
 
The court rejected Reynolds' claim that jurisdiction lay 
under Calder, holding that: "First, the press release 
concerned Reynolds' activities in Monaco, not Ohio. Second, 
the source of the controversial report was the drug sample 
taken in Monaco and the laboratory testing in France. 
Third, Reynolds is an international athlete whose 
professional reputation is not centered in Ohio. Fourth, the 
defendant itself did not publish or circulate the report in 
Ohio; Ohio periodicals disseminated the report. Fifth, Ohio 
was not the `focal point' of the press release. The fact that 
the IAAF could foresee that the report would be circulated 
and have an effect in Ohio is not, in itself, enough to create 
personal jurisdiction." 23 F.3d at 1120. 
 
The fact that Imo phoned Kiekert in response to Kiekert's 
letters does not change the analysis. The fact is that Kiekert 
never placed a phone call to Imo in New Jersey; all of the 
calls originated with Imo. Imo contends that this fact 
should not be dispositive, and that these calls should still 
count as contacts with the forum. Assuming for the sake of 
argument that we could even characterize these calls as 
contacts, we fail to see how they demonstrate Kiekert's 
targeting of New Jersey as the situs of its tortious acts. Cf. 
Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. DiVeronica Bros., Inc., 983 
F.2d 551, 556 (3d Cir. 1993) (follow-up calls by defendant 
into the forum insufficient to satisfy minimum contacts). 
Moreover, cases like Southmark and Far West make clear 
that a few calls or letters into the forum may be of only 
marginal import if the dispute is focused outside the forum. 
In Southmark, for example: 
 
       [T]he oral agreement with which USLICO allegedly 
       interfered was apparently negotiated and made in 
       Atlanta and/or New York, and there is no evidence that 
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       the agreement was made or to be performed in Texas 
       or governed by Texas law. Life, the other party to the 
       purported agreement, is not a resident of Texas. . .. 
       The company whose stock Southmark wished to 
       purchase and that USLICO did purchase was not a 
       Texas corporation and it did not, so far as the record 
       shows, do any business in Texas. Nor is there evidence 
       that the stock was located or purchased in Texas. 
 
Southmark, 851 F.2d at 772-73 (footnote omitted). 
 
Much the same could be said here. The solicitation of 
bids for Roltra was done in New York, and the bid with 
which Kiekert allegedly interfered came from a French 
company. The subject of the bidding was an Italian 
company, and the licensing agreement upon which the 
allegedly tortious activity was based appears to be governed 
by German law. In that light, the fact that it may be 
reasonably foreseeable that First Boston and/or Roltra 
would have passed Kiekert's letters on to Imo in New Jersey 
(and that Imo called Kiekert from New Jersey) cannot be 
sufficient to overcome the clear implication from the 
surrounding facts that New Jersey was not the focus of the 
dispute. See also Far West, 46 F.3d 1071, 1077 (finding 
that "phone calls and letters are not necessarily sufficient 
in themselves to establish minimum contacts" when the 
focus of the dispute is outside the forum). 
 
In sum, Imo cannot demonstrate that Kiekert expressly 
aimed its tortious conduct at New Jersey. Failing this, Imo 
cannot rely on the Calder effects test to confer specific 
jurisdiction based on Kiekert's allegedly intentional tortious 
conduct. Since Imo cannot meet the minimum contacts 
requirement of the Due Process Clause, we will affirm the 
order of the district court dismissing this case for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. 
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